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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND JUDGING:




I. INTRODUCTIONJ am honored to participate in this special tribute to the late Judge
Barefoot Sanders. Judge Sanders had a very distinguished career as a
jurist, attorney, and legislator. Judge Sanders's role in the efforts to
desegregate the Dallas Independent School District1 probably gave him
the most notoriety as a judge. But Judge Sanders also issued important
rulings in cases that addressed housing discrimination against develop-
mentally disabled individuals2 and inhumane conditions in Texas psychi-
atric hospitals. 3
As an assistant attorney general in the Johnson Administration, Judge
Sanders played a crucial role in the drafting and subsequent passage of
the Voting Rights Act.4 Many scholars have argued that the Voting
Rights Act has done more than any other statute to remove structural
barriers that prevented persons of color from participating in the political
process.
Judge Sanders's body of work symbolizes a period in American history
that has expired, at least for the moment. During this time period,
judges-supported by social movements, public opinion, and state and
local legislatures and executive officials-presided over lengthy "institu-
tional reform litigation."'5 In these cases, judges often acted in ways that
blurred the lines between judicial and executive power or national and
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. B.A. Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, J.D. Yale Law School. I would like to thank Charlie Gourlis for
his excellent research assistance.
1. See Tasby v. Moses, 265 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
2. See United States v. Wagner, 930 F. Supp. 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
3. See R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
4. The Voting Rights Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
5. David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform
Litigation-Commentary of the Supreme Court's Adoption of the Second Circuit's Flexible
Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1993). "In institutional reform litigation, plaintiffs...
seek long-term reform of the policies and conditions in government-operated institutions
through the use of equitable decrees." Id.
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local authority. 6 The wide scope of constitutional violations, coupled
with bad faith or recalcitrance by governmental officials, necessitated a
more complex and invasive judicial response. 7 For example, the Tasby
litigation, which challenged ongoing school segregation in Dallas, began
in 1970 8-sixteen years after the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board
of Education9 that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 10 Rather than comply with Brown, the Dallas school
district defied the Court's ruling and continued to deny students of color
equal access to educational opportunities. In order to cure the multiple
harms of segregation in a setting where local officials acted in bad faith
long after Brown, Judge Sanders and many other district court judges ac-
ted as judges, negotiators, and monitors in order to create unitary school
systems."
Institutional reform litigation developed specifically in post-Brown de-
segregation cases.' 2 But this type of litigation, which involved substantial
judicial involvement in the restructuring of public institutions, also took
place in the context of prison reform,13 challenges to dangerous condi-
tions in mental hospitals, 14 and the desegregation of public housing.15
A combination of politics and Supreme Court precedent (which are not
necessarily distinct)1 6 has severely eroded the use and legitimacy of insti-
tutional reform litigation, particularly in federal courts.17 Consequently,
many of the cases Judge Sanders decided represent the work product of a
bygone era.
Institutional reform litigation helped curtail many practices by state
and federal governmental actors that deprived individuals of constitu-
6. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1140-41 (1996). "Several authors
have criticized the judicial management of state institutions on both federalism and separa-
tion of powers grounds." Id. at 1140.
7. Id. at 1126.
8. See Tasby v. Esks, 444 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1971).
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Id. at 495.
11. Id.; see also Marian Wright Edelman, Southern School Desegregation, 1954-1973: A
Judicial Political Overview, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 32, 35 (1973).
12. David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Insti-
tutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015,1018 (2004). "Institutional reform cases are para-
digmatic exercises of judicial power in the public sphere .... Beginning with Brown v.
Board of Education, hundreds of schools, and, eventually, thousands of other government
institutions that were sued for constitutional and federal statutory violations came under
the dominion of injunctions and consent decrees." Id. (citation omitted).
13. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
14. See, e.g., R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
15. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
16. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy,
and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 17-19 (2005) (analyzing the impact of polit-
ics and public opinion on Supreme Court jurisprudence).
17. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1393-94 (2000). "By
the mid-1970s and early 1980s... a number of events signaled the demise of the structural
reform revolution, including the appointment of a number of conservative Justices to the
Supreme Court." Id. (citations omitted).
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tional freedoms. 18 The subsequent judicial retreat from institutional re-
form and the pervasiveness of social inequality, however, demonstrate
the limits of a litigation-centered approach to justice. 19 Regardless of an
individual judge's commitment to justice, litigation cannot substantially
modify inequality unless political actors, engaged social movements, and
the public support and legitimize the efforts of reform-minded judges.20
In the absence of such factors, a court-based strategy will not produce
sustained progress towards equality.21
This Article discusses the political and legal barriers that have surfaced
to undermine the ability of courts to fashion remedies that offer justice to
aggrieved individuals and to render rights-based institutional reform liti-
gation a judicial relic. Part II examines the historical development of in-
stitutional reform litigation and examines the political factors that created
the opportunity for dramatic changes in legal approaches to the issue of
racial inequality. Part III examines litigation challenging segregation in
Dallas public schools. It also discusses cases filed in the immediate post-
Brown era and contrasts those cases with Judge Sanders's rulings on the
subject. In addition, Part III considers social and political changes that
informed Judge Sanders's rulings, placing particular emphasis on Su-
preme Court rulings and social movement activity that influenced and
framed the battle over educational equality in Dallas. Part IV examines
the political and doctrinal barriers that have led to the sharp decline of
institutional reform litigation and that impede the ability of courts to of-
fer relief to subordinate communities. Part IV also considers whether po-
litical opportunities exist for reigniting a vigorous commitment to
substantive justice within the nation's courts and legislatures.
II. JUDGES AS POLICYMAKERS: INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM LITIGATION
A. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT THAT GAVE RISE TO
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION
The Supreme Court's initial ruling in Brown held that racial segrega-
tion in public schools violated the Constitution, but the Court did not
offer a remedy for the plaintiffs.22 Instead, the Court requested that the
parties submit briefs on the question of appropriate remedies.23 Once it
reviewed the parties' submissions, however, the Court again declined to
issue a remedy.24 Instead, it directed the district courts to do so. 25 Brown
//, the Court's "remedial" ruling, set the stage for judicial involvement in
18. See Zaring, supra note 12, at 1018-19.
19. See Gilles, supra note 17, at 1393-95.
20. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SO-
CIAL CHANGE? 299 (2008).
21. Id.
22. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
23. Id.




desegregation efforts,2 6 which ultimately led to broad litigation seeking to
reform public institutions such as schools, prisons, and psychiatric institu-
tions. 27 Brown supported the idea of far-reaching and even unpopular
federal court involvement in the administration of education in states that
mandated racially segregated public schools:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided
by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized
by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call
for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At
stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effec-
tuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in
making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with
the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954 decision.
Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest
in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective
manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of
disagreement with them.28
Despite the strength of the Court's language regarding the district
courts' use of equitable decrees to achieve unitary school systems, vigor-
ous judicial enforcement of the equality principle announced in Brown
did not begin until ten years after the ruling.29 Many political factors
explain the sluggish judicial response, including the white supremacist
"massive resistance" campaign launched in southern states.30 Govern-
mental and private actors in the South vowed to defy Brown with any
necessary means, including violence. 31 Racial terrorism and open defi-
ance of court rulings mandating desegregation, however, led to enhanced
public support for formal race equality measures, more intense and suc-
cessful activism by proponents of civil rights, and passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.32 President Eisenhower's decision to dispatch the
Arkansas National Guard in order to provide physical protection for
black children who sought to enroll at Little Rock Central High School in
1957, the City of Birmingham, Alabama's violent response to peaceful
26. Ann M. Gill, The Supreme Court's Rhetoric of Legitimization, in Brown v. Board
of Education at Fifty: A Rhetorical Perspective 143, 146 (Clarke Roundtree ed., 2004).
27. See Zaring, supra note 12, at 1018-19.
28. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
29. JAMES T. PATIERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILE-
STONE AND Irs TROUBLED LEGACY 91 (2001).
30. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7, 97-98, 107 (1994).
31. Id. at 129. "[T]he post-Brown racial backlash created a political environment in
which southern elected officials stood to benefit at the polls by boldly defying federal au-
thority and brutally suppressing civil rights demonstrations." Id.
32. Id. at 85 (asserting that Brown led to "a series of violent confrontations between
white supremacist law enforcement officals [sic] and generally nonviolent demonstrators,
which provoked an outcry from national television audiences, leading Congress and the
President to intervene with landmark civil rights legislation").
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antiracist protestors in 1963, and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 are important flashpoints in the historical timeline linking Brown,
social movement activism, countermovement backlash, and policy
innovation.33
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP,
AND LEGAL PROGRESS
President Eisenhower was not a liberal on racial issues. In 1957, he was
hesitant to support any civil rights legislation that contained provisions
addressing the disenfranchisement of blacks. 34 Eisenhower also firmly
stated in an interview that he could not "imagine any set of circumstances
that would ever induce [him] to send Federal troops ... into any area to
enforce the orders of a federal court."' 35 Furthermore, Eisenhower did
not personally support integration, and he even defended Southern segre-
gationists. 36 Eisenhower, nevertheless, feared that open defiance of the
law would create domestic instability that would injure the nation's image
internationally. 37 After violent crowds of whites threatened the safety of
black students who were selected by a relatively moderate local govern-
ment to attend Little Rock Central High School, Eisenhower decided to
send in the troops.38
Despite Eisenhower's dramatic intervention, a district court, in Cooper
v. Aaron, decided to delay desegregation for two and one-half years due
to the public outcry and violence. 39 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the decision, and the Supreme Court affirmed.40 The
Supreme Court issued an opinion signed by all nine justices. 41 The opin-
ion forcefully stated that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution
defeated contrary views held by Governor Faubus and other local offi-
cials.42 The Court's firm stance in favor of the rule of law in Cooper
resulted from a mixture of political and social factors, including backlash
and massive resistance to Brown and other civil rights developments, re-
newed antiracist political activism, and the official backing of Brown's
validity by Eisenhower. 43
Like Eisenhower, President Kennedy had a precarious relationship
with the ideals of racial justice. 44 And while the violent standoff over
33. Id. at 118-20, 129, 131-32, 141-47, 149.
34. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS, 1956-
1961, at 156-57 (1965).
35. Id. at 170.
36. See Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance,
and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1679 (1997) (discussing
President Eisenhower's views on race).
37. Id. at 1679-80.
38. Id. 1677-78.
39. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 18-19.
43. See Dudziak, supra note 36, at 1647, 1705-06, 1708, 1711, 1712.
44. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 121.
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segregation in Little Rock caused Eisenhower to retreat from his earlier
stance and dispatch federal troops, even more dramatic racial violence
motivated Kennedy to alter his views on the appropriateness of civil
rights legislation.45
During his campaign, Kennedy promised to sponsor legislation prohib-
iting racial discrimination in housing, but he delayed doing so for two
years following his election. 46 Kennedy also repeatedly failed to protect
black civil rights protestors from repression by southern officials, refused
a request to recognize the one hundredth anniversary of the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, stated during his first two years in office that he would
not sponsor civil rights legislation, and appointed known racist Walter
Williams Cox to the federal bench.47 Kennedy needed the South to win
his reelection, and his tepid stance on race issues appeased southern
whites and could have potentially enhanced his prospects for a second
victory.48
But just as the southern backlash caused Eisenhower to reverse his
course on the use of troops to enforce a judicial decree, countermove-
ment activity also led Kennedy to sponsor progressive race policies. 49
Kennedy's change in direction occurred in 1963-when Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. and Reverend Frank Lee Shuttlesworth organized a series
of marches that coincided with Lent, Good Friday, and Easter Sunday.50
The marchers used nonviolent means to protest rigid racial segregation in
Birmingham, Alabama, and the organizers scheduled the events during
the religious holidays to make use of their powerful symbols of peace,
sacrifice, and change. 51
The City of Birmingham responded with a dramatic display of repres-
sion. Dr. King, Reverend Shuttlesworth, and other organizers were ar-
rested and detained on criminal contempt grounds because they violated
an unconstitutional injunction that banned the marches. 52 The marches,
however, continued, and city officials continued to arrest protestors until
the jails were filled with black adults and youth.5 3 The most powerful
brutality occurred when Public Safety Commissioner Bull Connor, a
staunch segregationist, turned water cannons and attack dogs on nonvio-
lent black protesters, including many children.54 Ultimately, over 2,000
45. Id. at 77.
46. See Klarman, supra note 30, at 139.
47. Id. at 139-40.
48. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights
Movement 203-04 (2007).
49. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and
Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L.
REV. 645 (1995) (analyzing the political events that caused President Kennedy to support
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
50. Id.
51. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Birming-
ham, and the Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 791, 803-04 (1993).
52. Id. at 805-08.
53. Id. at 819.
54. Id. at 819-20.
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black protesters were arrested. 55
Print and television media captured Birmingham's violent response to
the protests and broadcasted the events domestically and internationally,
which led to widespread condemnation. 56 Public support for broad civil
rights legislation spiked after the broadcast of the marches and the City's
violent response. 57 Accordingly, the Kennedy Administration drafted
and introduced into Congress a bill that would later become the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.58 Kennedy was assassinated before the passage of
the legislation, which President Johnson eventually signed into law.59
One measure of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, prohibited racial
discrimination in the use of federal money and authorized the Attorney
General to bring lawsuits seeking to cut off funding of noncompliant
states. 60 Congress also passed the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1964, which provided federal assistance to states for public
schools.61 Title VI would have deprived southern states of these critical
federal funds unless they ended policies of segregation. Thus, federal leg-
islation had a dramatic impact on desegregation efforts. 62 In the first dec-
ade after the Brown decision, only slightly more than one percent of
black children in the South attended schools with white children.63 By
1972, this number had increased to nine percent. 64
Some scholars have concluded that the decline in segregation following
the enactment of civil rights legislation-rather than immediately after
the issuance of the Brown decision-demonstrates the inutility of judicial
enforcement of civil rights. This argument, however, ignores the courts'
roles in enforcing Brown following the enactment of the civil rights legis-
lation.65 Rather than indicating Brown's irrelevance, the dramatic inte-
gration of the 1970s resulted from an invigorated judiciary presiding over
school desegregation cases. 66 The passage of legislation designed to deter
segregation and the surge in public support for integration following the
Birmingham protests created a supportive political environment for the
effective judicial enforcement of Brown.67 The post-1964 era of rapid in-
tegration demonstrates that a mixture of domestic and international polit-
ics, public opinion, legislation, and presidential guidance influenced
55. Id. at 822, 824.
56. Id. at 820-21.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 825.
59. Id. at 826.
60. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 47.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 52.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 53.
65. Vincent James Strickler, Green-Lighting Brown: A Cumulative-Process Conception
of Judicial Impact, 43 GA. L. REV. 785, 807-08 (2009).
66. Neal Devins, Review Essay, Judicial Matters: The Hollow Hope: Can Court Bring
About Social Change? By Gerald N. Rosenberg, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1043 (1992).
67. See ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 94-95.
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broad societal changes in race relations and civil rights.68 Judicial en-
forcement toughened as the political branches' and the public's support
for civil rights measures increased. 69
C. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
In the 1970s, federal courts played an enhanced, if not a primary, role
in the enforcement of desegregation.70 Taking cues from Congress, presi-
dents, public opinion, and its own precedent, the Supreme Court decided
several cases that addressed and attempted to remedy the problem of
segregation in public schools. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education,71 the Court held that, in order to integrate a local school
district where virtually all of the black students attended all-black
schools, the district court could utilize several tools to dismantle segrega-
tion, including creating race-conscious attendance zones, establishing ra-
cial benchmarks and goals, and mandating the flexible use of busing.72
The Court's unanimous opinion mapped out a very liberal view of the
remedial power of federal courts: "If school authorities fail in their af-
firmative obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may be in-
voked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. '73
The Court also expressed frustration with ongoing efforts to evade its
rulings, mentioning specifically the "[d]eliberate resistance" and "dilatory
tactics" of recalcitrant school officials.74 Prior to Swann, the Court had
attempted to remedy practices that school districts utilized in order to
evade integration. For example, in Green v. County School Board, the
Court invalidated a Virginia school district's "freedom of choice" plan
that resulted in almost completely segregated schools. 75 Following
Brown, the district continued its policy of explicit discrimination. The
district adopted the voluntary assignment plan to avoid losing federal
funding after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.76 Despite the
fact that the tiny district lacked residential segregation and only con-
tained two public schools, it bused students along twenty-one bus routes
in order to maintain its dual school system.77
In Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, the Court ad-
dressed ongoing discrimination by an original party to the Brown litiga-
68. Id. at 94-106.
69. Id. at 106.
70. Sheerin N.S. Haubenreich, Sometimes You Have to Go Backwards to Go Forwards:
Judicial Review and the New National Security Exception, 8 CONN. PuB. INT. L.J. 1, 23
(2008).
71. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1971).
72. Id. at 15.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 13.
75. 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
76. Id. at 433 & n.2.
77. Id. at 432.
1642 [Vol. 62
Judge Sanders
tion.78 Ten years after finding that mandated segregation violated the
Constitution, the Court held that Prince Edward County violated the
Constitution by closing its public schools and providing vouchers for
white students to attend private schools that did not admit blacks.79 This
case demonstrated the extent to which state actors were willing to violate
legal norms in order to perpetuate white supremacy.
Although the Supreme Court delayed justice in the Brown decision,
the Court began to toughen its approach to integration after Congress
and the President joined the effort to desegregate the nation's schools
and after public opinion for integration increased. Accordingly, the
Court started to mandate that lower courts choose between a number of
flexible yet expansive remedies designed to achieve unitary school sys-
tems.80 The federal courts' increased involvement in the administration
of public schools served as the launching pad for institutional reform liti-
gation. In addition to cases involving desegregation, the courts also pre-
sided over cases challenging abuses in state-run mental hospitals, prisons,
and public housing. The development of this expansive litigation pro-
voked controversy and criticism contending that courts were incompetent
to make decisions concerning the subject matter of the litigation. Never-
theless, this litigation model lasted for almost two decades before an in-
creasingly conservative federal judiciary retreated from institutional
reform.
III. THE TASBY LITIGATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. PRE-TASBY CASES
The Tasby litigation, which challenged racial segregation in the Dallas
school system, began in 1970. But litigation seeking to end racial segrega-
tion in the Dallas public schools began in 1955 with a series of cases lead-
ing up to Tasby. A review of some of the cases preceding Tasby reveals
the commitment of white governmental officials, as well as some federal
judges, to racially segregated schools and white supremacy.
Black plaintiffs initially challenged segregation in Dallas public schools
in the 1955 case, Bell v. Rippy.81 The Bell court's ruling never cited
Brown, but construed Boiling v. Sharpe as holding that "all attempted
separation of the races in the United States is illegal and unconstitu-
tional."'82 Despite its broad reading of Bolling, the court refused to find
that racial segregation in the Dallas public school system violated the
Constitution. Instead, the court seemed to apply the repudiated "sepa-
rate but equal" standard and dismissed the complaint.83 Furthermore,
78. Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964).
79. Id. at 222-23, 234.
80. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 442 n.6.
81. Bell v. Rippy, 133 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Tex. 1955).
82. Id. at 812.
83. Id. "All of the law as declared by the various courts, appellate and trial, in the
United States, are agreed upon the proposition that when similar and convenient free
2009] 1643
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even though Brown I directed lower courts to use equitable remedies to
fashion relief for desegregation plaintiffs, Bell held that the district court
need not issue relief that "the Supreme Court itself decided not to
determine. 84
Borders v. Rippey85 was a second case that challenged Dallas public
school segregation. In Borders, the district court acknowledged the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Brown, but nevertheless considered whether "the
white and black school children of Dallas [can] be presently and hastily
integrated by force without frustration and injury to their educational op-
portunities. ' 86 The opinion, authored by Judge Thomas Davidson, con-
tained language that reflected the dense racist attitudes that existed
pervasively in the South during this time period.
For example, the opinion stated that "[i]ntegration has not helped ei-
ther race," that "[i]t has retarded the development of every land where it
has occurred," and that "patience" would bring about a better result than
integration by "force."' 87 The opinion also approvingly cited the Supreme
Court's ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson88-which Brown overruled in the ed-
ucational context-and, making arguments similar to those in Plessy, held
that integration must occur by the "consent of the parties affected. 89
The ruling also mirrored and exceeded Plessy by portraying both slav-
ery90 and Jim Crow as benevolent institutions, agreeable to both blacks
and whites .91 Judge Davidson also declared that "the races here at Dal-
las have been given equal opportunities for more than 60 years," a pa-
tently false observation that contradicted Brown.92 Finally, Judge
Davidson fearfully predicted that integration of young children through-
out their educational lives would lead inevitably to racial "amalgama-
tion," which made this proposition "the most objectionable of all features
of integration. '93
schools are furnished to both white and colored that there then exists no reasonable
ground for requiring desegregation." Id.
84. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955); Bell, 133 F. Supp.
at 812.
85. Borders v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
86. Id. at 403.
87. Id. at 404.
88. Id. at 408.
89. Id. at 417.
90. Id. at 405-06 (contrasting "horrific" conditions on slave ships run by "Arab slave
traders" and slave plantations where blacks allegedly enjoyed "the wide open space ...
with open air, food and kindness"); id. at 407 ("The Negro when treated kindly is one of
the most loyal of all races. But there came an interruption. He was summoned up to the big
house and told he was now free .... But these strong black people wept at the feet of their
mistress, not because they were free but because they were parting from some one [sic]
they loved.").
91. See id. at 403 ("The City of Dallas has had exceptionally good relations between
the two races and the question largely is how much haste can be exercised in applying
integration by force.").




Given his views about race, it should not have surprised either party to
the Borders litigation that Judge Davidson refused to order the school
district to implement any specific measures that would integrate Dallas
public schools. Judge Davidson even frowned upon the defendant's slug-
gish proposal to integrate one grade per year until the district achieved
full integration after twelve years of incremental change.94 Judge David-
son rejected this plan because he believed it would lead to interracial
marriages. 95
The district submitted an amended plan, which ensured the continua-
tion of a segregated school system for Dallas.96 The amended plan stated
that the defendant believed "a great many of the parents and children in
the District [were] vigorously opposed to wholesale and complete inte-
gration," that the defendant would survey parents and students to deter-
mine whether they favored integrated schools, and that the district would
attempt to "give all concerned what they prefer[red]. '97 The amended
plan also stated that "sweeping integration" would lead to "violence"
with all of the negative consequences that occurred in "Little Rock" and,
consequently, that the district would pursue "[v]oluntary acceptance and
cooperation. "98
Judge Davidson accepted the district's plan after announcing the
court's impotence to do anything other than to reiterate the "mandate
calling for integration"; beyond this, Judge Davidson held that "school
management [would] be left entirely to the school authorities."99 Judge
Davidson's opinion gave Dallas every incentive to maintain segregated
schools because it indicated that the court would not interfere with the
school district's decisions with respect to pupil assignment:
A white school board may not refuse a colored child the right to
enroll among pupils of the white race, but our judgment is that the
courts will not interfere with the arrangements of the schools so long
as there is due respect for the orders of integration. And the court
will not direct the school board as to what school the child may attend
if the board thinks that an allocation would be helpful to the school
system and even to the child himself in certain cases.100
94. Id.
95. Id. (arguing that "in 12 years adult pupils will be channeled together" and that
"your children will marry whomever they associate with").
96. Id. at 417-18.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 418.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added). The court offers the following hypothetical scenario as an
example that would qualify as a legitimate basis for reassigning a pupil:
[I]f an overgrown Negro boy in an integrated school should be by premature
growth inclined to sex and should write verses on the blackboard of an ob-
scene character designedly for the white girls to read or should make im-
proper approaches to them so as to provoke trouble in the school, he should




Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Davidson's ruling and di-
rected him to accept the incremental, twelve-year plan that the district
had originally proposed. 10 1
B. THE TASBY LITIGATION: JUDGE WILLIAM TAYLOR
Judge William Taylor presided over the Tasby litigation,102 which began
in 1970.103 Judge Taylor's first ruling in the case signaled a different-but
grossly inadequate-direction in the adjudication of desegregation
claims. Judge Taylor's opinion began with passionate language that ex-
pressed outrage over the continuation of segregation seventeen years af-
ter Brown condemned it.104 The opinion also detailed the undeniable
efforts by the school district to maintain segregation. At the time of the
ruling, most of the schools remained racially segregated, and only a few
students attended school in an integrated environment. 0 5
Despite the tone of Judge Taylor's opinion, the court failed to enjoin
segregation. Instead, the court ordered the school district to "integrate"
elementary schools by "television" or "satellite"-an early version of dis-
tance learning that would pair "white" and "black" schools to achieve a
shared learning experience without the expense of physical integration. 0 6
Judge Taylor explicitly stated that he opposed busing students for the pur-
pose of "mixing bodies."' 1 7 The court also ordered the district to imple-
ment a voluntary "majority-to-minority" school transfer policy for high
schools. 108 In order to promote the program, the court ordered the dis-
trict to offer participating students a "four-day school week" attendance
option, which would have lowered the volume of education and created a
situation where students would have unequal educational opportunities
in the same school. 10 9 The court also held that Latinos did not suffer de
jure segregation, but nevertheless held that a potential plan to integrate
high schools would include Latinos. 110
101. Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1960).
102. See Tasby v. Estes, 444 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 945 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
104. Id. at 947. According to Judge Taylor:
It is difficult to believe in this day and time that anyone anywhere would be
surprised, shocked or amazed at this case or at the pendency of this law suit.
It would be difficult for me to believe that anyone anywhere would be sur-
prised, shocked or amazed by what I am about to rule in this case at this
time.
Id.
105. Id. The opinion stated that:
[I]n the Dallas Independent School District 70 schools are 90% or more
white ... 40 schools are 90% or more black, and [there are] 49 schools with
90% or more minority, 91% of black students in 90% or more of the minor-
ity schools [and] 3% of the black students attend schools in which the major-
ity is white ......
Id.
106. Id. at 952.
107. Id. at 948.
108. Id. at 953.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 948.
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the distance learning component of the rul-
ing and the high school voluntary transfer option."' It agreed, however,
with the district court's holding that Latinos had not suffered de jure seg-
regation, and held that the district must include Latinos in a remedial
plan in order to prevent or compound their racial isolation.
112
A second ruling by Judge Taylor expressed a growing sense of cynicism
and frustration with respect to the case. The opinion described "legal
characters" in the "desegregation drama,1 13 and it included a personal
appeal by Judge Taylor to the "business leaders of Dallas" to help him
solve the crisis, which "was not a job for the Court alone. 114
By 1976, the year of Taylor's second ruling, the population of the Dal-
las public schools had changed dramatically: the district was no longer
"predominantly Anglo 115 due largely to very rapid white flight.11 6 De-
spite the changing demographics, the city had made "significant strides"
towards desegregation. 117 Judge Taylor approved a plan that created sev-
eral attendance zones or "subdistricts," which were racially diverse and
which could provide integrated education using the "neighborhood
schools" concept. The plan, however, excluded South Oak Cliff-which
would have been ninety-eight percent black and two percent Latino
under the court's order."l 8 The court reasoned that due to "factors of
time and distance," South Oak Cliff would remain almost exclusively
black.119 The court, however, suggested that renovating the facilities in
the area could make South Oak Cliff attractive to whites. 12
0
The Fifth Circuit remanded portions of the order, including the subdis-
trict plan. The appeals court found that the plan would leave too many
single-race schools intact-especially in the East Oak Cliff and Seagoville
areas. 12 1 The appeals court thus remanded the case once again for the
district court to justify the maintenance of every "one-race school" that
the plan would keep intact.' 22
111. Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 106-07.
113. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192, 1193-94 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
114. Id. at 1194.
115. Id. at 1197 (discussing the racial composition of the school district).
116. Id. (finding that the district had lost 40.9% of white students since 1971-the year
the district court held that the Dallas public schools were unlawfully segregated).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1204.
119. ld.
120. ld. "With the renovation of some of the facilities in this area, this subdistrict could
be a model for the district and the nation, and attract Anglos to it on the basis of its
superior programs and facilities." Id.
121. Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1978). The appeals court describes
the Oak Cliff subdistricts as "East Oak Cliff," while the district court used the label "South
Oak Cliff." Either way, the area would have remained completely nonwhite.
122. Id. at 1018. The court also affirmed a separate lower court order, which rejected
plaintiffs' motion to add the Highland Park Independent School District (HPISD) as a
defendant. The HPISD had explicitly discriminated against nonwhites until 1958, and after
that time, it used a discriminatory transfer policy that allowed nondistrict whites, but not
nondistrict blacks, to attend school in the area. At the time of the ruling, the schools were
one hundred percent white. Id. at 1015-16.
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C. ENTER JUDGE SANDERS
Judge Taylor recused himself from the case upon a motion filed by the
NAACP.123 The case was then reassigned to Judge Sanders. 124 By the
time Judge Sanders took over the case, the number of interested parties
had ballooned, but many others had dropped out along the way. A new
group, the Black Coalition, 125 joined the case months before Judge Sand-
ers's first ruling. Judge Sanders's explanation for allowing the party to
intervene demonstrated an appreciation for the complexity of the litiga-
tion and a willingness to accept challenging positions, which none of the
prior rulings on this issue exhibited. Judge Sanders stated that he granted
the request to intervene in the litigation because he wanted a complexity
of black opinion represented in the litigation:
The testimony offered by the large number of witnesses who testified
in [sic] behalf of the Black Coalition has convinced the Court that
there is considerable difference of opinion among sizeable segments
of the minority citizenry of Dallas over the type of relief that should
be ordered in this case. The Court is in no position, based on the
testimony offered thus far, to determine which of the parties speaks
for the greater number of Dallas blacks and Hispanics. It is doubtful
that such a thing can be accurately measured or surveyed, but even if
it were capable of proof, this is a finding that need not be made.
What is clear from the testimony is that no one party to this suit can
lay claim any longer to speaking on behalf of the entire minority
population as a sacrosanct "class."'1 26
To support his position, Judge Sanders cited the work of Derrick Bell, a
leading progressive scholar on racial justice and a lawyer for desegrega-
tion plaintiffs.' 27 Bell had long argued that many black plaintiffs actually
preferred improvements in the quality of education, rather than integra-
tion as such.128 According to Bell, middle- and upper-class blacks co-
opted the educational equality movement and abandoned the concept of
substantive justice advocated by poor plaintiffs. 12 9 Although Bell proba-
bly goes too far in treating integration and substantive justice as distinct
concepts, 30 his article highlights a very relevant conflict over the efficacy
123. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 688 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 690. The Black Coalition included "the Dallas Black Chamber of Com-
merce, Dallas Council of Black Parents and Citizens, Dallas Black Business and Profes-
sional Women, Dallas Committee of 100, Pylon Salesmanship Club, National Council of
Negro Women (Dallas Section), Dallas Ministerial Alliance, East Oak Cliff Citizens, and
the Dallas Urban League." Id. at 690 n.10.
126. Id. at 690.
127. Id. (citing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 507-08 (1976)).
128. See generally Bell, supra note 127.
129. See id. at 491-92.
130. "Separate but equal" was a legal fiction, and even today, most racially isolated
schools (especially in concentrated poverty neighborhoods) are unequally funded and un-
derperforming. See GARY ORFIELD, TiH CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REVIVING THE GOAL
OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 6 (2009), available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reviving-the-goal-Mlk 2009.pdf. The Su-
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or appropriateness of formal, rather than substantive, equality. Judge
Sanders granted the Black Coalition intervenor status to permit the
group to advocate equality premised upon the delivery of equal educa-
tion to black students, regardless of a school's racial composition. 31
The Black Coalition strenuously objected to the busing of very young
children outside of neighborhood schools.132 Judge Sanders ultimately
concluded that busing students from kindergarten to third grade was in-
feasible due to the demographics and size of the city. 133 He was "im-
pressed" by testimony regarding the inadequacy of busing from the
perspective of some blacks. Many blacks believed that busing was too
draining for children, did not allow parents to invest time and energy in
"community" schools, and would place children in non-nurturing or hos-
tile environments. 134 Many black parents testified that they preferred re-
medial measures that addressed the quality of education and that
corrected the injuries caused by years of segregation and
discrimination. 135
Judge Sanders's consideration of the interest of black parents in main-
taining racial isolation is rare for a desegregation ruling. This aspect of
the decision embraces the complexity of racial meanings that several criti-
cal race theorists have advocated. 136 Rather than always implying an im-
proper motive, race consciousness can serve egalitarian interests.137
But Judge Sanders also focused on substantive equality for a very prac-
tical reason: the demographics of the Dallas school district changed dra-
matically in the ten years following the first court ruling that found the
district had maintained unlawful segregation. The number of white stu-
dents attending district schools had plunged over 60% between 1971 and
1981.138 In 1971, the student population in Dallas public schools was
58.2% white, 33.4% black, and 8.4% Latino. 139. In 1981, the population
had changed enormously and was 29.5% white, 49.61% black, and 19.4%
preme Court has also long held that courts could order substantive improvements to
schools in order to address the effects of segregation. See, e.g., Miliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 282 (1977).
131. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 689-90 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Judge Sanders ob-
serves that:
The Black Coalition represents a substantial body of blacks who are opposed
to any escalation in the use of racial balance remedies to cure the effects of
school segregation. The Coalition prefers remedies designed to improve edu-
cational quality and to eliminate the disparity in academic achievement that
can be attributed to past segregation, as alternatives to remedies that require
pupil reassignments to non-contiguous attendance zones and mandatory
transportation.
Id. at 690.
132. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 736 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
133. Id. at 732.
134. Id. at 733.
135. Id.
136. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual
Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455 (2002).
137. Id. at 1457.




Latino.140 The local suburbs experienced enormous sprawl, and many
whites left the city.141 The changing demographics, the vast size of the
district, the existence of racially segregated neighborhoods, and conserva-
tive Supreme Court jurisprudence made an integrated education infeasi-
ble for many students in Dallas, absent extreme amounts of time
transporting students. 142
In light of these circumstances, Judge Sanders focused on improving
the quality of education for students in racially isolated areas. In particu-
lar, he ordered the defendant to study the feasibility of improvements to
schools in East Oak Cliff.143 In order to maximize integration, however,
Judge Sanders also ordered the parties to consider adjustments to attend-
ance zones for contiguous subdistricts, where integration could take place
without massive busing of students. 44 The court's final judgment was
extensive and provided for: the creation of magnet schools, curricular
improvements to remedy the vestiges of segregation, the busing of stu-
dents in grades four through eight (over the objection of some black par-
ents), the consolidation of schools in order to facilitate integration in
contiguous school zones, developing monitoring procedures in order to
evaluate racial composition and student performance, renovating facili-
ties in East Oak Cliff, promoting racial goals for the composition of ad-
ministrative personnel and teachers, and improving participation in the
"majority-to-minority" transfer program. 45
After Judge Sanders replaced Judge Taylor, the desegregation efforts
changed dramatically. But Judge Sanders's rulings occurred within a
broader context, in which the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Presi-
dent had already taken positions supporting desegregation. Locally, the
changing demographics of Dallas also created opportunities for substan-
tive justice. The population of blacks and Latinos in Dallas increased
dramatically between 1954 and 1981.146 And with the passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act and the judicial invalidation of racially discriminatory
practices in Texas, such as the "white primaries," blacks and Latinos were
achieving a modicum of political and economic power locally and nation-
ally. 147 Older judges who essentially followed Plessy and refused to en-
join segregation had died, and new appointments reversed the old
caselaw. The Fifth Circuit received tremendous praise for its decisions
protecting the equal protection rights of persons of color in the cradle of
Jim Crow.148 Despite all of the changes that permitted Judge Sanders to
140. Id.
141. Id. at 692.
142. Id. at 699-702, 724-44. This was especially true of students in East Oak Cliff.
143. Id. at 747-51.
144. Id. at 736.
145. Tasby v. Wright, 542 F. Supp. 134,138-51 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
146. Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 692-92.
147. DARLENE CLARK HINE, STEVEN F. LAWSON & MERLINE PITRE, BLACK VICTORY:
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS 254-56 (2003).
148. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SU-
PREME COURT JUSTICE 78 (2003).
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take a tougher stance on segregation, however, other national develop-
ments surrounding the legality of remedies for educational inequality
would constrain Judge Sanders and other reform-minded judges. These
factors continue to evolve and to impede the attainment of substantive
equality.
IV. THE END OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION
AND THE RETURN OF SEGREGATION
A. RETREAT FROM DESEGREGATION
Even before Judge Sanders took over the Tasby litigation in 1981, na-
tional changes in law and politics restricted what he could have done to
promote educational equality. Democrats and liberals paid dearly for
sponsoring the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The South experienced a dra-
matic political realignment, shifting away from the Democratic Party and
towards the Republican Party.149 Over time, the Republican Party modi-
fied its political platform to embrace socially conservative agendas, in-
cluding conservative policies on race. Since 1964, no Democrat has won a
majority of white votes cast in a presidential election, and Bill Clinton has
been the only two-term Democrat since Harry Truman. The Republican
dominance in national politics and the party's shift to social conservatism
led to the appointment of many conservative judges, who have reshaped
civil rights doctrine.
Although antiracist social movements, judges, and political actors de-
feated "massive resistance," Supreme Court jurisprudence has imple-
mented and responded to a conservative view of equality that immunizes
racial isolation and unequal funding of public schools from judicial invali-
dation.150 Several cases contribute to the current "separate" and "une-
qual" status of equal protection jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court
held in Milliken v. Bradley that courts cannot consider metropolitan rem-
edies unless suburban districts engaged in discrimination as well. 151 This
ruling ensured racial isolation in large cities that are populated largely by
blacks and Latinos with predominately white suburban areas.
The Court has also held that, in order to prove an equal protection
violation, plaintiffs must show that the defendant acted with "discrimina-
tory intent. '152 Applying this rule, the Court has typically considered sta-
tistical patterns of racial and gender discrimination that result from race-
or gender-neutral laws or policies as nonprobative of intent.153 Although
the earlier desegregation jurisprudence often construed race-neutral poli-
149. Susan Milligan, South May be Shifting in Democrats' Direction, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2OO8/10/31/south_
may-be-shifting.in-democrats direction/?page=full.
150. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 917, 950-54
(2009).
151. 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1975).
152. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
153. See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
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cies as state-sponsored methods of evading integration, the current
caselaw attributes racial isolation in schools to unproblematic neighbor-
hood segregation or class inequality. 154
Furthermore, the Court has held that vast disparities in school funding
within a state or district do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.155 In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court pointed
to local control to justify its refusal to invalidate school-funding policies
that favor students in wealthier districts over students in poorer dis-
tricts.156 More recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court rebuked a dis-
trict court for ordering expansive substantive improvements to schools
that endured decades of unlawful segregation. 157 The Court disagreed
with the lower court's use of scholastic performance in white suburban
schools as a mere "benchmark" for assessing whether the negative impact
of segregation had been remedied. 158 The Court held that this amounted
to an impermissible inter-district remedy prohibited by Milliken.159
When victims of unequal education turn to legislatures (rather than
courts) for assistance and attain redress for prior and ongoing harm,
courts often examine the remedies with skepticism. The Court, for exam-
ple, has severely limited the use of race by state actors to remedy past and
present discrimination. State actors cannot employ race-based measures
to remedy "societal discrimination,"' 160 even if that discrimination im-
pedes the ability of persons of color to access important social re-
sources. 161 And while the Court has been more permissive towards
policies that use race to "diversify" higher education, it has not allowed
similar approaches in primary and secondary schools. 162 In Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, for example, the
Court invalidated voluntary municipal plans implemented to prevent and
remedy racial isolation in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Ken-
tucky. 163 A plurality consisting of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito held that the policies could not support the
diversity interest affirmed in Grutter.164 A majority, consisting of the plu-
rality joined by Justice Kennedy, held that the policies were not narrowly
tailored.165 The plurality dismissed the problems of racial isolation in
schools, stating that resegregation is not segregation-which meant that
154. Id. at 737-41.
155. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
156. Id. at 49-54.
157. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98-100 (1995).
158. Id. at 75-76, 90-93.
159. Id. at 93-94.
160. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
718-35 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., writing in part for the majority and in part for the plurality);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-508 (1989).
161. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. 701.
162. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-33 (2003).
163. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 702-03.
164. Id. at 722-33 (plurality opinion).
165. Id. at 733-35 (majority opinion).
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states do not have a compelling interest in remedying its effects. 166 Ac-
cording to the plurality, because the school districts did not formally or
implicitly mandate segregated attendance, nongovernmental factors, such
as class and residential segregation must cause racial isolation. 167 Ac-
cordingly, the cities could not use race-specific policies to prevent racially
isolated schools.168
B. CONTEMPORARY SITUATION: RESEGREGATION
AND POVERTY SCHOOLS
1. Resegregation
Although the Parents Involved plurality dismissed the relevance of ra-
cially isolated schools, a recent report published by the Civil Rights Pro-
ject at UCLA 169 details the dramatic impact of resegregation in the
nation's public schools. Due to the vast amount of litigation and civil
rights enforcement directed towards southern states, this region has be-
come the most integrated part of the country. 170 Currently, however, the
South is moving rapidly towards resegregation1 71 Shifting demographics
in school districts, conservative court precedent, and a lack of political
commitment to integration have greatly contributed to resegregation. 172
Although high percentages of students of all races attend racially iso-
lated schools, "majority-minority schools" are more likely to be "poverty
schools."'1 73 These schools are generally underfunded, underperforming,
and unstable with respect to continuity of staff; they also typically suffer
from criminal activity, which further harms the educational process. 174
Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, makes it difficult to combat this
problem through litigation or legislation. 175
Although conservative jurisprudence facilitates the denial of equal ed-
ucational opportunity, in terms of political geography, the liberal versus
conservative dichotomy evaporates. Many of the most racially isolated
poverty schools exist in the nation's "bluest" states. According to the
Civil Rights Project, the ten states with the lowest percentages of black
students attending schools with white students are New York, Illinois,
California, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia,
and Tennessee.176 In terms of black students attending highly segregated
166. Id. at 727-31, 736-45 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. at 731-32.
168. Id. at 731-33.
169. See generally ORFIELD, supra note 130.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 6-8.
173. Id. at 15-16.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id. at 28-29, 31-32.
176. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HISTORIC RE-
VERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION




schools (90%-100% minority students), the list is almost identical: New
York, Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Alabama,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Missouri.177
With respect to Latino students' exposure to white students, the ten
most segregated systems are located in California, New York, Texas, New
Mexico, Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Arizona, Maryland, and Flor-
ida.178 The states with the highest percentages of Latino students attend-
ing highly segregated schools (90%-100% minority) are New York, Texas,
California, Illinois, New Jersey, Arizona, Rhode Island, New Mexico, Ma-
ryland, and Florida.179
In 1979, California voters amended the state constitution to prohibit
state courts from ordering busing or student reassignment unless a fed-
eral court would do so under the same circumstances. 80 The amend-
ment, called Proposition 1, effectively toughened the legal standard for
remedying racial isolation in the state's public schools because at the
time, California law, unlike federal law, prohibited both intentional and
de facto racial segregation in public schools.' 81 The movement to pass
Proposition 1 began while a state judge contemplated issuing a busing
order to cure segregation in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. 182 The
amendment made the proposed remedy illegal under state law.183 Today,
California has one of the most racially segregated school systems in the
country.
2. Funding Inequality
In the 1978 case San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court held that funding inequality across school districts
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 84 Funding inequality re-
sults because, in most states, property taxes finance school expenditures.
Wealthier districts with higher property values can generate greater tax
revenue and allocate substantially more money for their education budg-
ets.185 Although poor white persons suffer from this problem as well,
persons of color more often live in "concentrated poverty" neighbor-
hoods than poor whites. Accordingly, funding inequality, though prob-
lematic across racial groups, has a distinct racial effect.
The Federal Education Budget Project of the New America Founda-
177. Id.
178. Id. at 32.
179. Id.
180. Peggy Caldwell, Court Considers Racial Intent of Two States' Anti-Busing Laws,





184. 411 U.S. 1, 42-55 (1973).
185. Id. at 6-16.
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tion has compiled data on funding inequality within each state. 186 This
research reveals that, in addition to having the most racially segregated
school systems, the "blue" states also have the highest levels of school
funding disparities in the nation.1 87 According to the Federal Education
Budget Project Report, the "South is the most equitable region" with re-
spect to school funding.188 Specifically, the ten states with the most
evenly funded school districts are Hawaii, West Virginia, Florida, Iowa,
Washington, Delaware, North Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin, and Louisi-
ana.189 By contrast, the most inequitable states (from bad to worst) are
Idaho, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, Wyoming, Missouri, Massa-
chusetts, Virginia, Montana, and Illinois.
3. Possible Resurgence in Desegregation Efforts?
The forgoing statistics indicate that the problem of educational inequal-
ity is complex. Southern states are experiencing rapid resegregation,
while northern states house many of the most racially isolated poverty
schools.190 The type of social movement activity and judicial and political
leadership that gave rise to the vast changes in the 1960s has not become
part of current national policy debates.' 9' To the extent that either ma-
jor political party discusses economic justice, the conversation is framed
around the "middle class," rather than poor people. Furthermore, most
of the national discourse on education has focused on reforming or sim-
ply criticizing "No Child Left Behind," rather than addressing financial
inequality.' 92
The public has neglected race issues as well. President Obama's elec-
tion victory has caused many commentators to question the ongoing rele-
vance of race. Obama campaigned as a "post-racial" candidate, and he
has not made race a serious part of his executive agenda. 193 Unless social
movement actors push for racial and economic justice, the legal landscape
for educational inequality will likely remain the same.
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Sanders did what no other judge before him would do: he or-
dered the Dallas Independent School District to make substantive
changes to its attendance policies in order to dismantle segregation.194
186. New America Foundation, Federal Education Budget Project http://febp.new
america.net (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
187. New America Foundation, Federal Education Budget Project, Per-Pupil Expendi-
ture 2006, http://febp.newamerica.net/kl2/rankings (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
188. New America Foundation, Federal Education Budget Project, School Finance Eq-
uity (2006), http://febp.newamerica.net/kl2/rankings/schofiineq06 (last visited Aug. 29,
2009).
189. Id.
190. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 176, at 14, 16.
191. Id. at 8, 13-14.
192. Id. at 18-22.
193. Id. at 5-10.
194. Tasby v. Wright, 542 F. Supp. 134, 138-51 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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The broad policy changes regarding educational inequality resulted from
interaction between courts, social movements, presidents, Congress, local
politicians, and voters. Judge Sanders's highly detailed opinions on racial
segregation hearken back to a lost judicial moment, when courts con-
nected with communities, social movements, and state actors in order to
reform unlawful institutional practices. This particular aspect of Judge
Sanders's work ranks as one of his most important contributions as a
judge.
